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OBLIGATIONS TO THE CHILDREN
OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
PHILIP G. PETERS, JR.*
Two paradigms dominate contemporary ethical and legal debate
about the risks posed to children who owe their lives to reproductive
technology. One asks whether the children have lives so tragic that
life itself is harmful. The other approach asks whether children so
conceived are likely to enjoy a minimally decent existence. Although
the two approaches have quite different analytic foundations, they
share one crucial trait. Each concludes that children who owe their
lives to reproductive technology are harmed only when that technol-
ogy causes genuinely catastrophic injuries.
Because these conventional paradigms define harmful conduct
exclusively by reference to the magnitude of the injuries suffered, they
sometimes lead to indefensible conclusions. In Italy, for example,
authorities recently shut down a Florentine sperm bank that was sell-
ing the sperm of a man infected with hepatitis C and genital herpes to
fertility clinics throughout Italy.1 The sperm bank's failure to screen
its donors posed unnecessary risks to would-be mothers and their chil-
dren. Under conventional analysis, however, no harm was done to
any of the children affected by the sperm bank's failure to screen
* Ruth L. Hulston Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. J.D., University
of California at Berkeley, 1976; A.B., Harvard University, 1972. I am grateful for the comments
of John Robertson, Bonnie Steinbock, Melinda Roberts, Len Riskin, and Chris Guthrie; for the
assistance of Cheryl Poelling and Cindy Shearrer; and for the generous financial support of the
Myers Memorial Faculty Research Fellowship and the Fred J. Young Faculty Research
Fellowship.
1. See Diseased sperm forces fertility clinics to close, ST. Louis PoST-DIspATCH, Nov. 30,
1997, at A5. Both diseases can also be transmitted to the mothers via the sperm.
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because their only alternative to life with their illnesses was nonexis-
tence. Better screening would not have improved their health.
Instead, it would have resulted in the birth of a different child. Under
conventional analysis, therefore, no harm was done by the failure to
screen unless the affected children Would have been better off never
existing at all.
This conclusion defies common sense. Better screening would
have avoided needless suffering. Responsible clinics already know
this. They screen. Yet, conventional analysis cannot account for their
concern. Because it focuses exclusively on the magnitude of the inju-
ries suffered by the children actually born, conventional analysis over-
looks the possibility that individuals using reproductive technology
could reduce future injuries by conceiving other children who would
suffer less. These injuries are avoidable by the substitution of one
child for another.
Because conventional analysis looks only for individual victims, it
ignores the harm that can be inflicted on future children as a class
when irresponsible reproductive choices are made. Although the nar-
row focus of conventional thinking is appropriate in legal actions for
compensatory damages, where proof of harm to the individual plaintiff
is essential, it needs supplementation when the issue is whether future
generations would benefit from public health regulation.
This Article explores an alternative way of determining whether
an existence-inducing act is harmful to future children. The methodol-
ogy proposed here focuses on the choices available to providers and
parents who engage in reproductive conduct. When they choose a
risky route over a safer one (perhaps, because it is more profitable,
less risky to the mother, or more likely to result in conception), they
threaten the welfare of future children.
Imagine, for example, a fertility clinic that implants more
embryos than its competitors in order to maximize its success rate,
even though this policy increases the number of dangerous multiple
births. Or imagine a woman who is able to conceive naturally but
chooses to clone herself despite the risks of using old DNA. These
choices may cause unnecessary future suffering. Contrary to conven-
tional analysis, the harmfulness of these choices does not turn exclu-
sively on the magnitude of the injury inflicted. Harm can also be
caused by the use of a dangerous procedure when a safer one is
available.
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Part I of this paper reviews the contemporary reproductive set-
tings in which these issues currently arise and introduces the debate
over harmfulness. Part II examines the conventional ways of identify-
ing harmful reproductive conduct. Parts III and IV then propose and
explore a class-based method of identifying harm to future children
that focuses on the choices made by parents and providers. The likely
criticisms are answered in Part V.
I. THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT
For decades, ethicists and legal scholars have debated the moral
implications of the unknown dangers that new reproductive technolo-
gies pose to future children. First, artificial insemination prompted
this discussion; later, it was in vitro fertilization and surrogacy.2
Recently, two events have brought this issue back to prominence.
First, the birth of the McCaughey septuplets and the Chukuri
octuplets has renewed fears that unregulated fertility treatments
would expose many parents and children to the risks of multiple
pregnancies.3 Second, Dr. Ian Wilmut cloned a sheep named Dolly,
producing an ethical and regulatory frenzy over the prospect of
human cloning.4
According to the National Center of Health Statistics, the
number of triplets has more than tripled since the 1970s, and fertility
treatments account for most of this increase.5 Fertility drugs, for
example, induce women to produce more than one egg in a single
cycle.6 And fertility clinics routinely implant more than one embryo
when they perform in vitro fertilization and other similar procedures.
As a result, both of these fertility treatments increase the risk of multi-
ple pregnancy. In fact, 75% of the triplets, 90% of the quadruplets,
and all of the quintuplets are born to women under treatment for fer-
tility problems.'
2. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Protecting the Unconceived: Nonexistence, Avoidability, and
Reproductive Technology, 31 ARiz. L. REv. 487, 490-92 (1989) (reviewing the debates and col-
lecting citations).
3. See Barbara Carton, Agonizing Decision: Multiple Pregnancies Are Often Pared Back in
"Fetal Reduction," WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1997, at Al.
4. See CLONING HLTmAN BEINGS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
BIoETHIcs ADVISORY CONMSSION 3-8 (1997) [hereinafter NBAC Report].
5. See Daney Q. Haney, In Fertility Field, Septuplets are Failure Multiplied, USA TODAY,
Nov. 21, 1997, at 3A.
6. See Ellen Goodman, Standards Will Help Reduce Multiple Birth Catastrophes, COLUM-
BiA DAILY TiNB., Dec. 4, 1997, at 6A.
7. See Carton, supra note 3, at A6.
[Vol. 8:375 1999]
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Unfortunately, multiple births are associated with an increased
incidence of blindness, learning defects, lung problems, and other ail-
ments.8 Quintuplets are twelve times more likely to die in infancy.
And many of the survivors will have serious medical problems.9 For
this reason, the United Kingdom has placed a limit on the number of
embryos that may be transplanted at one time."° "Does the mother
have the right," asks Dr. John Balint, "to expose these little creatures
to the risk of marked prematurity, with the risk of cerebral hemor-
rhage, bowel infarctions, lung complications and so forth?"" Should
a woman whose fertility drugs have produced too many eggs wait until
"the bus is not so full,"? asks ethicist Thomas Murray.12
Like multiple pregnancies, cloning too may pose risks to the
safety of future children. Although this risk probably is not the major
source of the widespread uneasiness about human cloning, it is the
risk most widely agreed upon and, thus, provided the articulated basis
for the National Bioethics Advisory Commission's (NBAC) recom-
mendation that a three-to-five year moratorium be placed on human
cloning.
Within twenty-four hours of the announcement that Dolly had
been cloned using a technique known as somatic cell nuclear transfer,
President Clinton called for a moratorium on human cloning
research.' 3 A few months later, the NBAC issued its report, recom-
mending that the cloning technique used to clone Dolly be temporar-
ily banned. 4 The NBAC's recommendation "was based almost
entirely on safety considerations: the high likelihood of failure and a
8. See id. at Al; Geoffrey Cowley and Karen Springer, Multiplying the Risks: More Group
Births Mean More Preemies and, Often, More Problems, NEWSWEErK, Dec. 1, 1997, at 66. Multi-
ple pregnancies also place financial, emotional, and physical burdens on parents that could harm
the welfare of both the parents and the children. See Fertility Experts Decry Multiple Births: One
Healthy Baby is the Goa4 They Say, ST. Louis PosT-DsPATcn, Nov. 21,1997, at AS [hereinafter
One Healthy Baby].
9. See Carton, supra note 3, at A6.
10. The maximum currently is three and may soon be reduced to two. See Carton, supra
note 3, at A6. Boston's Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center sets a limit of three embryos and
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine recommends a maximum of four embryos for
women aged 35-40 and five for older women. See id.
11. Carton, supra note 3, at A6.
12. Goodman, supra note 6. Physicians often urge women to wait a month. But doing so
increases the costs. See One Healthy Baby, supra note 8 at A8. See also John McCormick &
Barbara Kantrowitz, The Magnificent Seven, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 1997, at 58, 61.
13. See John A. Robertson, Wrongful Life, Federalism, and Procreative Liberty: A Critique
of the NBAC Cloning Report, 38 Juivimrmcs 69 (1997).
14. See NBAC Report, supra note 4. The Commission's proposal would apply only to the
cloning that uses the technique reportedly used to clone Dolly: somatic cell nuclear transfer. See
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consequent high rate of miscarriage, and the unknown risk of develop-
mental abnormalities in the offspring."' 5 President Clinton sent Con-
gress legislation to outlaw the cloning of humans for at least five
years.' 6 When Dr. Richard Seed announced his plans to establish a
center for the cloning of humans,17 President Clinton renewed his call
for a prohibition.'"
In recommending a temporary prohibition on the cloning of adult
human cells to create new human beings, the NBAC expressed its
belief that dangers to cloned children make cloning morally unaccept-
able at the present time.19 It said:
The prospect of creating children through somatic cell nuclear
transfer has elicited widespread concern, much ... in the form of
fears about harms to the children who may be born as a result.
There are concerns about possible physical harms from the manipu-
lations of ova, nuclei, and embryos which are parts of the technol-
ogy, and also about possible psychological harms, such as a
diminished sense of individuality and personal autonomy.... Virtu-
ally all people agree that the current risks of physical harm to chil-
dren associated with somatic cell nuclear transplantation cloning
justify a prohibition at this time on such experimentation.20
The Commission specifically rejected the argument that cloned chil-
dren are only harmed if they would be better off unborn.
This metaphysical argument, in which one is forced to compare
existence with non-existence, is problematic. Not only does it
require us to compare something unknowable-non-existence-
with something else, it also can lead to absurd conclusions if taken
to its logical extreme. For example, it would support the argument
that there is no degree of pain and suffering that cannot be inflicted
on a child, provided that the alternative is never to have been
conceived. 21
id. at 1, 13, 33. The Commission did not make any proposals dealing with cloning by embryo-
splitting.
15. Bonnie Steinbock, The NBAC Report on Cloning Human Beings: What It Did-and
Did Not-Do, 38 JummTiucs 39-41 (1997).
16. See Clinton Attacks Physicist's Intention to Clone Humans; President Calls the Plan by a
Chicago Scientist "Profoundly Troubling," ST. Louis PoST-DIsPATCH, Jan. 11, 1998, at A3 [here-
inafter Profoundly Troubling].
17. See Scientist Makes Plans to Clone a Person, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH, Jan. 7, 1998, at
A7.
18. See Profoundly Troubling, supra note 16, at A3.
19. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 4, at 63-65, 79-82.
20. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 66.
[Vol. 8:375 1999]
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The Commission concluded that the wrongful life approach was not
administrable and would lead to absurd results.
As John Robertson has subsequently noted, the Commission's
analysis is vulnerable to several criticisms. For example, the Commis-
sion's analysis arguably relies on the very comparison that it says is
impossible. If it is better for cloned children not to be born, suggests
Robertson, then the Commission has implicitly concluded that nonex-
istence is preferable.2" Robertson also notes the Commission's mis-
taken belief that the wrongful life approach would never permit
intervention on behalf of suffering children. In truth, the wrongful life
model would favor intervention whenever the anticipated suffering is
so severe that nonexistence would be better.23 Robertson could also
have included one additional criticism: the Commission did not articu-
late or defend an alternative conception of harmfulness that would
support its conclusions.24
Still, one cannot think about the risks posed by existence-induc-
ing technologies without sharing the Commission's intuitions that the
wrongful life paradigm misses something important in our under-
standing of harmful conduct. The conduct of the Italian sperm bank is
just one example of conduct whose harmfulness is not captured by
conventional analysis. The same can be said of the fertility clinic that
implants an unreasonable number of embryos or the physician who is
22. Robertson, supra note 13, at 76. There is no evidence, Robertson suggests, "that feared
harms of cloning would cause such physical or psychological suffering that the child's very exist-
ence would be a wrongful one." Id. at 74. Robertson also makes several other cogent points in
his criticism of the Commission's recommendation. He notes, for example, that the Commis-
sion's reasoning would also make it unethical to knowingly give natural birth to children who are
not fully healthy, physically or psychologically. Id. at 73-74.
23. See id. at 75-76. Robertson also persuasively rebuts the Commission's contention that
this comparison is "metaphysical." He notes that the comparison is made from the standpoint of
the living child. See id. at 75. As I and others have noted, this test of harmfulness really calls for
a comparison between the benefits of life and the burdens of life, a judgment that we routinely
permit severely ill patients and their proxies to make. See, e.g., Nora K. Bell & Barry M.
Loewer, What is Wrong with "Wrongful Life" Cases, 10 J. MED. & PHIL. 127, 138 (1985); Joel
Feinberg, Wrongfid Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 145,
158-59, 161-67 (1986); Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in "Wrongful Life" Actions, 42
HAsIrN~s L.J. 505, 518 n.58 (1991); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Illusion of Autonomy at the End of
Life: Unconsented Life Support and the Wrongful Life Analogy, UCLA L. REv. 673, 698-99
(1998).
24. As Robertson notes, "Either the conclusion that it is unethical because of harm to
children should be rejected, or some other basis for the ethical claim established." Robertson,
supra note 13, at 76. This Article accepts his challenge to offer another basis.
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willing to clone children for individuals who could have conceived nat-
urally. This essay attempts to outline an analytic framework for the
intuition that choices of this kind can be harmful.
II. CONVENTIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF HARM
Under conventional legal analysis, to cause harm is to make
someone worse off than she would otherwise have been75 In tort law,
this conception of harm is embodied in the "but for" test of causation-
in-fact.26 In most cases, the application of this test is quite straightfor-
ward. A driver who strikes a pedestrian has harmed the pedestrian.
A physician who carelessly prescribes drugs that injure a pregnant
patient and her fetus has harmed both of them. These simple exam-
ples involve the infliction of harm that could fairly be described as
ordinary harm.
When a disputed act is existence-inducing, however, its harmful-
ness is typically more difficult to measure.27 Assume, for example,
that a fertility clinic's failure to adequately screen its egg donors
results in an unnecessarily high incidence of genetic disabilities among
the resulting children. Under conventional analysis, no harm has been
caused by failure to screen unless the children actually born have lives
that are worse than the alternative-never existing at all. Only in
those rare circumstances where the injuries are so catastrophic that
life itself is harmful can the failure to screen be said to have made
these children worse off than they would otherwise have been. Even a
clinic's failure to screen for HIV infection may not rise to this level.
25. See, e.g., James S. Fishkin, Justice Between Generations: The Dilemma of Future Inter-
ests, in 4 SocIAL JusTicE: BOWLING GREEN STUDIES IN APPLIED PHILOSOPHY 23, 24 (Michael
Bradie & David Braybrooke eds., 1992). For a masterful and comprehensive study of the notion
of harming, see JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS (1984).
26. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (1982); PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 266
(5th ed. 1984).
27. Sometimes, however, even existence-inducing activities can inflict ordinary harm. A
fertility clinic that carelessly stores frozen embryos, causing injuries that could have been
avoided, causes ordinary harm to the injured child. Indeed, Melinda Roberts persuasively
argues that ordinary harm also occurs in some contexts mistakenly assumed to be governed by
the wrongful life paradigm. For example, multiple cloning may injure the genetically-identical
children by depriving them of their individuality, see, Mona S. Amer, Breaking the Mold: Human
Embryo Cloning and its Implications for a Right to Individuality, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1677-
84 (1996) (proposing that cloning be limited to a single success). It could have been avoided by
cloning only one child. See Melinda Roberts, Human Cloning: A Case of No Harm Done?, 21 J.
MED. AND PHIL. 537, 545 (1996). See also Melinda Roberts, Present Duties and Future Persons:
When are Existence-Inducing Acts Wrong?, 14 LAW & PHIL. 297, 324-26 (1995).
[Vol. 8:375 1999]
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As John Robertson notes, a person with HIV infection may have
"years of life that are good for her. '28
In wrongful life tort actions, American courts have wholeheart-
edly endorsed this way of analyzing the harmfulness of existence-
inducing acts. They have uniformly concluded that mistakes, such as
negligent sterilization,29 which lead to the birth of a child with disabili-
ties do not harm that child unless her life is worse than not existing at
all.3° In the rest of this paper, I will refer to this demanding test of
harmfulness as the wrongful life approach.
If similar logic is used to ascertain the state's interest in regulating
reproductive technology on behalf of future children, then the inter-
ests of those children will rarely, if ever, be taken into account. The
risks associated with reproductive technology will very rarely be so
catastrophic that life itself is harmful.
Bonnie Steinbock and others, including this author, have argued
that the nonexistence threshold as traditionally construed is too strict
and that persons who engage in existence-inducing conduct ought to
provide the resulting children with a minimally-decent existence.31
28. JoHN, A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 76 (1994).
29. See, e.g., Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1984).
30. See, e.g., Gleitman v.Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (NJ. 1967); Stewart v. Long Island
College Hosp., 296 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44-45 (1968), modified, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div. 1970).
Nearly all courts have refused to recognize a tort cause of action on behalf of the affected chil-
dren. Some courts do not trust the jury's ability to calculate damages based on this comparison
between life and nonexistence. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967);
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978). Other courts worry that recognition of
such a claim would impugn the sanctity of life. See, e.g., Blake v. Cruz, 690 P.2d 315, 321 (Idaho
1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 702 (Ill. 1987); Smith v. Cote, 513
A.2d 314, 352 (N.H. 1986). See also DAvid HEYD, GENETrICS 30 (1992) (arguing that wrongful
life suits are improper because it is not possible to compare life to nonexistence because there is
no value to nonexistence). These judicial conclusions were mistaken. See Philip G. Peters, Jr.,
The Illusion of Autonomy at the End of Life: Unconsented Life Support and the Wrongfil Life
Analogy, 45 UCLA L. REv. 673 (1998); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Protecting the Unconceived: Nonex-
istence, Avoidability, and Reproductive Technology, 31 ARIz. L. Rnv. 487, 502 (1989).
31. See, e.g., Michael Bayles, Harm to the Unconceived, 5 PHIL. & PUB. Art. 292, 302
(1976); Cynthia B. Cohen, "Give Me Children or I Shall Die!" New Reproductive Technologies
and Harm to Children, HAsTnlGs CENTER REP., March-April 1996, 19,24; Fred Feldman, Justice,
Desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion, 7 UTILrrAs 189, 196 (1995); E. Haavi Morreim, The Con-
cept of Harm Reconceiveda A Different Look at Wrongful Life, 7 LAWv AND PHIL. 3 (1988); Peters,
supra note 2, at 542-45; Bonnie Steinbock and Ron McClamrock, When is Birth Unfair to the
Child?, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 15, 21; Bonnie Steinbock, The Logical
Case for "Wrongful Life," HAsnNos CENTER RP., April 1986, 15, 19. See also Matthew Han-
ser, Harming Future People, 19 PHIL. & PuB. AFFAIRS 47 (1990) (arguably supporting a mini-
mum quality of life). This modification of the wrongful life threshold of harmfulness is
intuitively appealing. However, defending it is a difficult assignment. After all, the resulting
children have lives that are beneficial on balance even if they do not meet some ideal minimum
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This method of identifying the interests of future children broadens
the range of cognizable harm, but only marginally. A "decent mini-
mum" requirement continues to limit the notion of harmful conduct
to reproductive behavior that causes catastrophic injury. Although
this alternative to the wrongful life approach usefully expands the
concept of harmful conduct, it fails to explain why the behavior of the
Italian sperm bank seems irresponsible. For that, another notion of
harmfulness is needed-one that focuses on the choices available to
the actor, rather than the absolute magnitude of the injury to the
child.
III. MAXIMIZING THE WELL-BEING OF
FUTURE CHILDREN
By focusing exclusively on the presence or absence of harm to the
children actually born, conventional analysis completely ignores the
possibility that individuals using reproductive technology could reduce
future injuries by conceiving other children who would suffer less.
These are injuries that are avoidable by substitution of one child for
another.3a Behavior of this kind causes future generations to suffer
unnecessarily and, accordingly, threatens their collective welfare.
quality of life. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 364 (1984); ROBERTSON, supra
note 28, at 75-76, 122; Melinda Roberts, Present Duties and Future Persons: When are Existence-
Inducing Acts Wrong?, 14 LAW & PHIL. 297, 302-33 (1995); James Woodward, The Non-Identity
Problem, 96 ETHICS 804, 815 n.12 (1986). The articles cited here employ a variety of strategies to
justify this shift in the threshold. In addition, Ronald Green, the Interim Director of the Office
of Genome Ethics at the National Institute of Health's National Center for Human Genome
Research, offers a more unique benchmark. He suggests that children are owed a quality of life
equal to that of others in the child's birth cohort. Ronald Green, Parental Autonomy and the
Obligation Not to Harm One's Child Genetically, 25 J. LAW, MED. & ETHIcs 5, 8-9 (1997). See
also MICHAEL BAYLES, MORALITY AND POPuLAnON POLICY 3 (1980) (advocating a duty not to
make it unlikely that future generations will have an equivalent quality of life). Under contem-
porary conditions, that promises to be a more robust obligation than a decent minimum.
Because his proposal uses average well-being as its benchmark, it has some superficial similari-
ties to the proposal made in this essay. Fundamentally, however, his approach is quite different
as the obligation he discusses does not appear to arise out of, or depend upon, the availability of
safer reproductive options. Taking a quite different route, James Woodward has argued that
children can be wronged when parents have children knowing that they cannot fulfill their
parental obligations to the children. See Woodward, supra at 815; James Woodward, Reply to
Parfit, 97 ETHIcs 800 (1986). While Woodward's thesis is intriguing, it is quite narrow in its
application. He concedes that there would be no obligation not to have children who will be
well cared-for. It would not apply to impairments that do not arise out a failure to meet parental
obligations. As a result, his thesis would not reach the cases of the sperm clinic or Dr. Seed.
32. See Peters, supra note 2, at 510. See also Dan W. Brock, The Non-Identity Problem and
Genetic Harms-The Case of Wrongful Handicaps, 9 BiOETHIcs 269, 273 (1995).
[Vol. 8:375 1999]
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Such behavior is exemplified by a fertility clinic that implants
more embryos than its competitors in order to maximize its success
rate and, thus, its business, even though this policy increases the
number of dangerous multiple pregnancies. Likewise, a woman who
is able to conceive naturally, but chooses to clone herself despite the
risks of using old DNA is taking avoidable risks with her future chil-
dren. Any injuries caused by these choices could have been avoided.
The harmfulness of these acts lies not in magnitude of the injury,
but in the decision to take a risky route to reproduction when a safer
one was available. The conventional model of harming overlooks this
kind of harmful conduct because it does not make a specific child
worse off. If the safer route had been chosen, a different child would
have been born. Because conventional analysis requires an individual
victim, it overlooks the fact that the collective welfare of future chil-
dren is impaired by decisions of this kind. Although conventional wis-
dom's insistence on proof of harm to a specific individual is
appropriate in actions for compensatory damages, this narrow notion
of harming should not be relied upon by legislatures and administra-
tive agencies contemplating public health regulation.
A. PARFIT'S IMPATIENT MOTHER
The English moral philosopher Derek Parfit offers the provoca-
tive story of a woman who is advised by her doctor not to become
pregnant until she gets over a temporary illness that causes birth
defects.33 Although she could wait two months for the condition to
pass, she ignores his advice and conceives a child who suffers the
deformity. Intuitively, her choice was a harmful one. Yet, if she had
waited, another child would have been born. The child actually born
would not have existed. Because that child's only alternative to living
with this deformity was nonexistence, conventional wrongful life anal-
ysis tells us that no harm was done unless life with her disability is
worse than never existing at all. 34
This conclusion assaults our common sense. The unacceptability
of this conclusion is reinforced by comparing it with the conclusion
that would be reached if, instead, the mother had possessed the power
33. Derek Parfit, On Doing the Best for Our Children, in ETHICS & POPULATION 100
(Michael D. Bayles ed., 1976). Parfit also uses the example of a 14-year-old girl who chooses to
have a child rather than to wait. PAR=oT, supra note 31, at 358-59.
34. See, e.g., Parfit, supra note 33, at 101; Bayles, supra note 31, at 297; Joel Feinberg,
Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 145, 168-69.
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to prevent the birth defects by taking medication during her preg-
nancy. In that event, her failure to take the medication would
unquestionably constitute harmful conduct because the child actually
born could have been born without these injuries. These vastly differ-
ent conclusions simply do not pass a moral gut test.36 Both mothers
had an equal opportunity to avoid human misery. Both caused unnec-
essary human suffering.37
The inadequacy of the traditional model is further illustrated by
comparing its conclusions in the case of unscreened sperm with those
that result when a sperm clinic negligently stores its sperm. Under
traditional notions of harmfulness, the negligent storage of sperm
causes ordinary harm because reasonable care could have prevented
injury to the resulting children. By contrast, the failure to screen for
infected sperm, because it changes the identify of the resulting chil-
dren, is harmless unless the injuries caused are so catastrophic that life
itself is harmful. Once again, two similarly culpable choices have dra-
matically different implications under conventional theory-implica-
tions that are not consistent with common norms of responsible
behavior.
The conclusions dictated by conventional analysis in these two
examples reveal the need for supplementation. Conventional analysis
overlooks the harm caused to future children as a class when a dan-
gerous means of reproduction is chosen in lieu of a safer one. Choices
of this kind cause unnecessary suffering. Parents intuitively under-
stand this idea. They avoid reproduction while on powerful drugs.
Many screen themselves or their embryos for genetic abnormalities.
Even Dr. Richard Seed, the notorious physician who purportedly
plans to clone humans in the near future, understood the power of this
moral perspective. His initial proposal would ostensibly have
restricted access to cloning to couples who were both infertile. Why
would he impose such a narrow restriction? Dr. Seed understood that
cloning would be more vulnerable to criticism if used by couples with
access to less controversial reproductive options, such as artificial
35. See Parfit, supra note 33, at 103. Syphilis might be one such condition. See Robertson
& Schulman, Pregnancy and Prenatal Harm to Offspring: The Case of Mothers With PKU, HAs-
TInGS CENTER REP., Aug./Sept. 1987, at 26. By contrast, AIDS also presents a risk of infected
offspring, but the absence of treatment makes the risk unavoidable for the mother who wishes to
bear her own child. See id. at 31.
36. See Peters, supra note 2, at 513-14.
37. See Feinberg, supra note 34, at 178. Parfit calls this the "no-difference view." PARmrr,
supra note 31, at 367-68.
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insemination or egg donation. By excluding these couples, he reduced
his vulnerability to the charge that his plans would harm future chil-
dren by substituting a more risky procedure for a less risky one.
B. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
A prima facie duty to minimize suffering finds its strongest sup-
port in utilitarian theory.3" Derek Parfit, for example, recognized that
having the happier child would maximize social utility. Table I illus-








Child A Child B
. Child Welfare
Assume, for example, that Option A is to conceive a child natu-
rally and Option B is to clone a child. If cloning is reasonably
believed on balance to threaten the welfare of the resulting child more
than natural conception,39 then Option A maximizes the well-being of
38. Parfit felt that an appeal to "rights" could never solve cases like the failure to delay
pregnancy because no specific individual is made worse off. Parfit said that the wrong in these
cases is not "person affecting." PARurr, supra note 31, at 378. Fishkin describes the analysis in
these cases as "identity independent." Fishkin, supra note 25, at 26. He notes that this method
of assessing interests is, in this sense, anonymous. See id.
39. Cloning may confer some benefits as well as some burdens. See Susan M. Wolf, Ban
Cloning? Why NBAC is Wrong, 27 HASTINGs CENTER RnP., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 12-13 (cloning
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the anticipated child. From a utilitarian standpoint, therefore, Option
A is better for future children.4 °
Derek Parfit articulated a principle that he called the "Q" to cap-
ture this insight.4 '
If in either of two outcomes the same number of people would ever
live, it would be bad if those who live are worse off or have a lower
quality of life than those who would have lived.42
Translated into simpler language, Q exhorts providers and would-be
parents to have the child who will suffer least.
A prima facie obligation to avoid unnecessary suffering is also
consistent with the method of moral reasoning associated with John
Rawls 43 and sometimes called Ideal Contractualism.44 This approach
identifies binding moral obligations by asking whether they would be
chosen by people who are under a veil of ignorance and, thus, are
unaware whether they would bear the brunt of the chosen principles.
I believe that people under the veil would agree, all other things being
equal, that parents and the individuals who assist them should try to
have the children who will suffer least. Although Parfit and others
have suggested that we cannot imagine a future in which we do not
exist, I believe that we can and that most people would prefer that
their welfare be maximized if they are to be born at all.41 Put differ-
ently, they would favor the avoidance of unnecessary suffering.
Indeed, it is remarkable that so obvious a proposition has not
already become a part of the fabric of academic thinking about repro-
ductive decisionmaking. Yet, only the American philosopher Dan
could spare children the difficulties of having an anonymous genetic parent as they would if
donor egg or sperm were used).
40. Whether it is absolutely better would turn on the utilities to other persons, like parents,
of the choice between Option A and Option B. The point of this analysis is that child welfare
should constitute a component of overall utility analysis.
41. PARF=T, supra note 31, at 360.
42. Parfit also called this principle "The Same Number Quality Claim." Id.
43. JOHN R iWLS, A THEORY OF Jusric (1971).
44. See PARn'r, supra note 31, at 391.
45. However, Parfit disagrees. He assumes that we cannot imagine a history in which we
do not exist. PAnsrr, supra note 31, at 392. See also Jan Narveson, Moral Problems of Popula-
tion, in ETmcs AND POPULATION 59, 78 (Michael D. Bayles ed., 1976) (finding the prospect
"perfectly mind-boggling"). Parfit reports that other writers assume that we would choose a
history that maximizes the future population, as long as the lives lived are worth living. Id.
Narveson, however, assumes that our inability to imagine that we would not exist would lead us
to maximize average utility and a better quality of life for those who do exist. Id-
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Brock46 has endorsed Parfit's model and applied it to reproductive
technology.47 Thus far, no legislator has publicly relied upon this con-
ception of harmful conduct to defend the regulation of reproductive
technology. Perhaps that is because legislators feel free to rely on
their personal moral barometers without the need for a philosophical
defense. Yet this reliance leaves them open to criticisms that their
position is unprincipled. Furthermore, reliance on untutored intu-
itions will tempt legislators to assume that all the burdens imposed by
a reproductive technology are harmful. However, that is not the les-
son of Q. The harmfulness identified by this model lies in the choice
of a dangerous option over a safer one. As a result, no conclusions
about the harmfulness of a person's choices can be reached until the
alternatives realistically available to the decisionmaker have been
identified and examined.
In this respect, the NBAC's analysis of cloning was too blunt,
The propriety of taking the risks associated with cloning turns on the
alternatives available to the parents. The case for permitting cloning
despite its risks will be strongest when the would-be parents are both
infertile and ineligible to adopt.4" It will also be strong when both
carry the genes for horrible birth defects. It will be weakest when a
would-be parent is fertile and simply insists on having an identical
child or a child cloned from some famous public figure.
Under the expanded conception of harmful conduct proposed
here, a three-step inquiry will be needed to determine whether regula-
tory action is appropriate. The first step is to identify the parenting
options realistically available to the affected parents and clinicians.
The second is to compare the advantages and disadvantages of each
alternative from the perspective of the resulting children.4 9 Finally,
46. Dan W. Brock, The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms-The Case of Wrongful
Handicaps, 9 BioErscs 269, 271 (1995).
47. A few other philosophers have hinted that they endorse a similar idea in the context of
population policy. See, e.g., Gregory Kavka, The Paradox of Future Individuals, 11 PHIL. & Pun.
AFFAIRS 93, 105 n.24 (1981); Woodward, supra note 31, at 806-07.
48. Whether adoption should be treated as an available option and, if so, whether parental
interests in genetically-related children would justify refusal to adopt are examples of the inter-
esting second-generation questions arising out of a duty to do the best you can.
49. It is important to emphasize that this analysis requires an honest appraisal of the bur-
dens and benefits of the reproductive methods under scrutiny. Some controversial reproductive
technologies, such as cloning, may actually offer advantages to the affected children that could
potentially offset the burdens associated with the technology. Studies of genetically identical
twins, for example, suggest that this relationship can confer significant emotional benefits. See
Susan M. Wolf, Ban Cloning? Why the NBAC is Wrong, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct.
1997, at 12, 13. Cloning may bestow some of the same benefits. See id.
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the interests of future children must be balanced against the rights and
interests of parents and providers. Only then can a final decision
about regulatory action be made.
It is crucial to emphasize that this proposal does not dictate or
even support state intervention every time a harmful choice is made.
The interests of future children must be examined alongside the rights
and interests of parents, providers, and the community as a whole.5"
Those rights and interests will vary with the circumstances. Other
principles, like procreative liberty and maternal bodily autonomy will
often override the obligation to avoid harm to future children. The
significance of this new way of looking at the interests of future chil-
dren is not that it requires intervention in every case, but that it
requires justification in cases overlooked by more conventional
notions of harm.
The strongest cases for state regulation are likely to involve dan-
gerous reproductive conduct on the part of clinics, researchers, and
other third parties. These regulations will least directly interfere with
the procreative and privacy interests of would-be parents. Regulation
of this kind might include rules governing the harvesting of eggs and
the acquisition of sperm, prohibitions on use of stale gametes or
embryos, and minimum accreditation requirements for fertility spe-
cialists. Other potential targets of regulation are the artificial repro-
ductive practices that least directly implicate the traditional zone of
procreative privacy. Cloning is an obvious example. So, too, are
extra-corporeal techniques, like in vitro fertilization. Practices least
likely to pass muster are interventions that directly interfere with a
woman's bodily integrity, such as the mandatory genetic screening of a
woman or her fetus.51
IV. DIFFERENT NUMBER CASES
The goal of respecting the interests of future children is easiest to
operationalize when a choice must be made between two reproductive
options that will each result in the birth of a single child. In these
In addition, we must avoid unsubstantiated assumptions about the burdens imposed by birth
defects. Studies of persons with disabilities indicate that they view their quality of life more
positively than others would expect.
50. See, e.g., John Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Preg-
nancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. Rev. 405 (1983); John Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not So
Novel After All, HAsTrNGs CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 28-29.
51. The extension of class-based interest analysis to genetic screening is discussed further in
the text infra at notes 80-83.
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cases, the anticipated welfare of the child born using one method can
be compared to the anticipated welfare of the child born using the
other. Table 1, above, illustrates simple choices of this kind.
Maximizing the welfare of future children is a much more com-
plex task when the choice among reproductive options will affect the
number of children who are eventually born. Imagine, for example,
that a fertility clinic is deciding whether to increase the number of
embryos that it is willing to implant at one time. Assume further that
using additional embryos will increase the risks of multiple pregnancy,
premature birth, and serious medical problems.5 Would it be better
to aim for single pregnancies? Table 2 depicts a simplified version of
this choice.53
52. See supra notes 9-12.
53. A more complex model would take into account the uncertainties in both the chance of
injury and the odds of a live birth using each procedure. My own preliminary assessment is that
the probability of injury can be taken into account in a relatively straightforward way by dis-
counting the harm to reflect the odds. Taking the odds of live birth into account is likely to be
more complex. Policy A, for example, may be to implant 3 embryos. It may pose a 40% chance
of no births at all, a 50% chance of one child, and a 10% chance of multiple births. Policy B, by
contrast, may be to implant 6 embryos. It could have a 20% chance of failure, a 50% chance of
single birth, and a 30% chance of multiple birth. Any comparison between these policies must
compare the sum of these probabilities. Interestingly, a recent British study found that transfer-
ring three embryos, rather than two, increases the chance of multiple births, but not the rate of
pregnancy. Temple A. Morris, Reducing the risk of Multiple Births by Transfer of Two Embryos
After In Vitro Fertilization, 339 N. ENrO. J. MED. 573 (1998).
Although this complication certainly makes ethical analysis of the choice more complex, it
raises only one new logical problem. That is how to take into account the chance that the pro-
creative effort will fail altogether. It is easy to see how this prospect is contrary to the interests
of the parents and, therefore, will need to be taken into account before final decisions about
ethical and legal propriety are made. However, it is less clear how this possibility affects the
interests of the future children. My tentative conclusion is that the case against a particular pro-
creative choice will weaken in direct proportion to the odds that the safer course of action will
fail to result in a live birth. A prima facie obligation to do the best you can assumes that an
alternative, safer way of having a child is available. If not, then the avoidance of unnecessary
suffering analysis is inapplicable and the wrongful life analysis should be used to evaluate the
harmfulness of the reproductive choice.
This limitation on avoidability by substitution analysis is easiest to appreciate when a couple
has absolutely no possibility of conceiving naturally and is unable to adopt. Under these circum-
stances, the choice to use assisted reproduction cannot be compared against natural conception.
If the chosen method of assisted reproduction is the safest one available, then its use is only
harmful to future children if their lives are worse than never existing at all.
The analysis is more complicated when the safer procreative strategies reduces, but does not
eliminate, the risk of failure. The larger the chance of success using the safer procedure, the
larger the cohort of future children whose lives could have been improved. The smaller the
chance of success using the safer procedure, the smaller the opportunity for welfare gains and
thus the weaker the case for intervention in the name of future children.









[] Child Welfare: Option A
Child Welfare: Option B
Option A will produce a single child with an anticipated welfare
of 90. Option B will produce three children, each with an anticipated
welfare of 70. Which choice optimizes the welfare of future children?
The answer turns on the measure of utility used to compare the two
outcomes. Option A will maximixe average utility, while Option B
will maximize total utility.
A. CONFLIcTING PARADOXES
Both average utility and total utility can lead to unappealing pref-
erences under some circumstances. A preference for total utility, for
example, seems to force us "to prefer a huge, wretched population to
a smaller, happy one, as long as the quantity of the huge population
allows its total utility to exceed the total utility of the smaller popula-
tion. '54 Parfit called this "the Repugnant Conclusion."55 Applied in
the context of reproductive decisionmaking, a total utility approach
would often prefer multiple pregnancies over single ones, even if mul-
tiple pregnancies were strongly associated with serious physical or
emotional injuries. Table 3 illustrates the Repugnant Conclusion.56
54. Michael B. Laudor, In Defense of Wrongful Life: Bringing Political Theory to the
Defense of a Tort, 62 FoRDHsm L. Rlv. 1675, 1679 (1994).
55. PARFIT, supra note 31, at 388.
56. In addition, reliance on total utility measures arguably implies a duty to procreate as
long as the utility generated by the additional lives outweighs the burden imposed on other
persons. See PARFIT, supra note 31, at 381-90. Summers argues, however, that we are already
past the point where more population is the best means of promoting human welfare. L.W.
Summers, Classical Utilitarianism and the Population Optimum, in OBLIGATIONS TO FuTunn
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D- Child Welfare: Option A
E Child Welfare: Option B
The Repugnant Conclusion can be avoided by relying on average
utility. 7 Average utility favors choices that produce the greatest aver-
age welfare. In Table 3, that would be the single child option (Option
A) because it produces an average welfare of 90, rather than 10.
Regrettably, average utility also has shortcomings. Average util-
ity, for example, seems to favor a population policy that will result in
10 exquisitely happy people over a policy resulting in ten miliion very
happy people. Average utility also seems to condemn the addition of
one more happy person to a happy community if that person's well-
GENERATIONS 91 (R.I Sikora & Brian Barry eds., 1978). Furthermore, James Woodward argues
that the repugnant conclusion is artificial because rights violations would occur well before the
population is stretched to this point. Woodward, supra note 31, at 828.
At any rate, the duty proposed in this essay is narrower. It would require only that parents
and providers who do decide to have children do a decent job of it.
57. See PARnTr, supra note 31, at 401.
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being is slightly lower than the others.5 8 That is the Mere Addition
Paradox. 59
Parfit was unwilling to choose between these two measures of
utility. He was, therefore, unable to extend his preference for having
the happier child in same number cases (his "Q") into a broader prin-
ciple (which he called "X") that would provide guidance for choices
between courses of conduct that result in a different number of lives.60
Nevertheless, he remained convinced that some such principle must
exist.6 '
B. SOLVING THE DIFFEuRNT NUMBER CASES
The underlying difficulty with the choice between average and
total utility is that each illuminates a morally relevant factor. Average
utility emphasizes quality of life while total utility emphasizes quan-
tity.62 Because both indicia can be relevant in some circumstances, an
acceptable theory of moral obligations must be able to take both into
consideration.63
The possibility of combining the two considerations in a single
formula has been most elegantly explored by Thomas Hurka.64 Writ-
ing in the context of population ethics, Hurka persuasively argues that
58. See Laudor, supra note 54, at 1684. This is a standard characteristic associated with
average utility. However, average utility considerations, properly interpreted, would not neces-
sarily condemn every birth of a "below average" child. Michael Bayles wisely observes that:
A rule utilitarian would adopt a rule concerning having children such that general con-
formity to that rule would not lead to a lower average happiness. Such a rule might
permit having children whose happiness would be below average so long as there would
be enough children above the average that it would not decrease."
Michael D. Bayles, Introduction to ETHICs AND POPULATION ix, XX (Michael D. Bayles ed.
1976). By contrast, conduct, like cloning, that threatens to lower the overall average would be
objectionable.
59. See Laudor, supra note 54, at 1678-79; PARFIT, supra note 31, at 419-20.
60. Same number cases do not require a similar choice because having the happier child, as
illustrated in Table 1, advances both average and total utility. For this reason, Parfit's "Q" prin-
ciple is explicitly limited to "same number" cases.
61. See PARFrr, supra note 31, at 380-441.
62. See id. at 401.
63. See id. at 405. Parfit considered combining the two. He hypothesized a combination of
the two factors in which quality of life would count down to a threshold amount and then be
discounted entirely. Because this threshold approach was quite blunt, it produced results that
are vulnerable to criticism. However, the use of a sliding scale or weighted formula should
eliminate the counterintuitive implications of more blunt combinations.
64. Thomas Hurka, Value and Population Size, 93 ETHIcs 496 (1983).
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total utility declines in importance relative to average utility as popu-
lations increase. Thus, the value that an additional individual contrib-
utes to the world is not constant, but varies with the number of other
humans alive. While the value of additional people would be enor-
mous following a crisis that shrank the population dramatically, as
occurred in the biblical story of Noah or might occur following a
nuclear holocaust, its value diminishes greatly when the human popu-
lation reaches its current size.65
A formula which captures this variability avoids many of the
unattractive aspects of both the average and total utility principles.
By giving more weight to average utility when population levels are
high, this approach avoids the Repugnant Conclusion except in the
rare circumstances when increased numbers are genuinely more
important than quality of life. By giving extra weight to increases in
population size when total population is low, this compromise reflects
how many of us already feel about population policy. This hybrid also
avoids the Mere Addition Paradox in the most objectionable cases; it
concedes that population increases are desirable despite a negative
impact on quality of life when human survival is least secure. Hurka's
hybrid, variable approach has the advantage of escaping the principal
problems of both average and total utility in those situations where
the shortcomings seem least tolerable. As a result, it constitutes a
genuine improvement over exclusive reliance on either total or aver-
age utility alone.66
A strong argument can be made that average utility should
receive greater weight than total utility in this hybrid formula. As Jan
Narveson notes, "we are in favor of making people happy, but neutral
about making happy people ... it seems repulsive to think that the
goodness of a community is a function of its size."'67 And John Rawls
65. See id. at 497. A similar adjustment could be made to reduce the importance of margi-
nal increases in average utility as the average gets higher.
66. Not everyone feels so favorably towards Hurka's work. James Hudson points out some
potential shortcomings of this compromise. James L. Hudson, The Diminishing Marginal Vahle
of Happy People, 51 PHILOSOPHICAL STUIES 125 (1987). Hudson is a totalist who appears to
object to any compromise with averagism. Hudson concedes that a hybrid offers advantages
with respect to the Repugnant Conclusion. However, because he does not find the Repugnant
Conclusion to be repugnant, he feels that this advantage is not sufficient to justify accepting the
problems that he sees with average utilitarianism. See id. at 132, 134-35. He does not address
the advantages that a hybrid offers in connection with the Mere Addition Paradox.
67. Narveson, supra note 45, at 73.
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has concluded that average utility is the only version of utility obtaina-
ble using his theory of justice.6" Maintaining and improving the qual-
ity of life of people who actually exist seems more crucial than
maximizing the number of persons who live, at least under current
social and population conditions. As a result, average utility should
be weighted more heavily in a hybrid formula that takes into account
the impact of reproductive behavior on both average and total utility.
This solution of the dilemma posed by "different number" cases
has direct implications for public health regulation. It instructs
lawmakers who are considering restrictions on a particular reproduc-
tive technology to evaluate the likely impact of that technology on the
average and total utility of the resulting children. Because the impact
on average utility should be given greater weight, relatively small
decreases in average utility could only be offset by relatively large
increases in total utility. Promising candidates for such regulatory
scrutiny would include fertility clinics that regularly transplant an
extremely high number of embryos and fertility drugs strongly associ-
ated with multiple pregnancies.
V. CRITICISMS
Critics are likely to raise three key objections to the methodology
proposed here. The first is that it identifies a phantom category of
"harm" that has no victims and, therefore, has little, if any, moral sig-
nificance. The second is that the utilitarian methodology underlying
this notion of harmfulness has undesirable consequences. And the
third is that an obligation to minimize future suffering could have
unwanted implications for other reproductive conduct such as genetic
screening.
A. VICrIMLESS HARM?
The conception of harmful conduct proposed here postulates that
conduct can be harmful even though it makes no spedific child worse
off than he or she otherwise would have been.69 It is harmful because
68. RAwL.s, supra note 43, at 166; Narveson, supra note 45, at 77-78. However, Rawls ulti-
mately rejects average utility as a general moral theory.
69. As a result, an action for conventional compensatory damages on behalf of the children
actually born would be inappropriate except in those rare cases where life itself is harmful.
However, a claim for child support might be defensible under some circumstances. See Philip G.
Peters, Jr., Rethinking Wrongful Life: Bridging the Boundary Between Tort and Family Law, 67
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it causes unnecessary human suffering. Although there are no individ-
ual victims, future children suffer as a class if the technologies used do
not maximize the well-being of the resulting children.7° As they suf-
fer, the community suffers. Dan Brock correctly observes that these
reproductive choices are "person-affecting" in the sense that they
inflict unnecessary human suffering.7 '
This way of conceptualizing harmful conduct explains better than
any alternative model why we have such a strong negative reaction to
the conduct of the Italian sperm bank and the impatient mother.72
John Robertson has trivialized this insight by describing it as a "norm
against offending persons who are troubled by gratuitous suffering." 73
It is not simply a norm about offending sensibilities. It is a norm
against inflicting gratuitous suffering.74
B. UTILITARIAN VULNERABILITIES?
Many of those who feel uncomfortable with parental failure to
use the safer alternative may, nonetheless, have misgivings about the
utilitarian underpinnings of a class-based interest analysis. In particu-
lar, they may fear the trade-offs commonly associated with unre-
strained utility analysis.75 The typical illustration of these trade-offs
involves the sacrifice of one person so that his organs can be used to
save the lives of several other people.76
TuLANE L. Rv. 397 (1992). Those circumstances are much less likely to occur in the circum-
stances discussed in this Article than they are in a wrongful life case, where parents are trying to
avoid conception or birth. However, unexpected multiple births might be a candidate.
70. See Brock, supra note 32, at 275.
71. See iL at 273.
72. Because this class interest approach compares the health or happiness of the two
groups of possible children, it arguably assumes that causing a person to exist can benefit him.
Parfit states that both views on this issue are defensible. PARFrr, supra note 31, at 490. But that
controversial assumption is not essential to the conception of harm proposed here. Even if we
cannot directly prove that causing someone to exist is a benefit, we can coherently ask whether a
person's life is or would be good. See id. at 487-89. See Singer, A Utilitarian Population Princi-
ple, in ET-cs AND PoPuLAION 81 (1976). This question permits comparisons of how good life
is or would be for different children. See PARFrr, supra note 31, at 489. As a result, the likely
happiness of the two groups of possible children can be compared.
73. Robertson, supra note 13, at 76.
74. See Dan W. Brock, Procreative Liberty, 74 TEx. L. REv. 187, 203-04 (1995) (reviewing
JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECH-
NOLOGIES (1994)).
75. See, e.g., Laudor, supra note 54, at 1685-86.
76. See JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE To OTHERS 80 (1985). Both the average utility approach
and the total utility approach have sacrifice implications if accepted in their entirety. See
MICHAEL D. BAYLES, MORALITY AND POPULATION POLICY 103-12 (1981).
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Fortunately, it is not necessary to endorse utilitarianism so whole-
heartedly in order to favor the analysis proposed here. Utilitarian
tools are used here solely to solve a problem posed by the shortcom-
ings of more traditional, rights-based analysis in the unique circum-
stances associated with existence-inducing acts. The analysis proposed
here uses utilitarian calculus to give content to the idea of beneficence
in the context of future people.77 Most rights-based theories make
beneficence an important moral consideration. Furthermore, no
actual child is asked to suffer for the sake of the greater happiness of
someone else.78 As a result, one can reasonably endorse this limited
use of utility analysis while insisting that the goal of beneficence be
subject to other moral norms, such as equal justice or a Kantian reluc-
tance to use people as means to an end.79
C. EXTENSION OF THE ANALYSIS TO GENETIC SCREENING
The normative implications of a class-based analysis of harm are
not limited to the avoidance of dangerous reproductive technologies.
The same logic could potentially impose affirmative obligations on
parents in other settings as well. John Robertson, for example,
assumes that a class-based analysis of harm would mandate "a moral
duty to undergo carrier or prenatal diagnosis and abort if tests are
positive."8 0 In his view, "such a counterintuitive result suggests a flaw
in the argument."8"
In reaching this conclusion, Robertson mistakenly assumes that
regulatory decision-making would turn exclusively on this class-based
interest assessment. He overlooks the larger analysis of which class-
based interest analysis is just one part. Class-based analysis only iden-
tifies the interests of future children in reproductive decisions. Deter-
mining whether a specific action is morally or legally obligatory also
requires an analysis of the rights and interests of parents and provid-
ers who will be affected by a prohibition or restriction. As explained
77. See Derek Parfit, Future Generations: Further Problems, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 113,
129 (1982).
78. See Feldman, supra note 31, at 202 n.22 (noting that this approach would not permit the
killing of someone already in the world); Fishkin, supra note 25, at 30 (noting that these utility
calculations apply only to future people, and not to actual people).
79. See PA=IT, supra note 31, at 366, 394. As James Woodward notes, we need a theory
than combines both consequential and nonconsequential components. Woodward, supra note
31, at 83.
80. Robertson, supra note 50, at 448.
81. Id. However, Parfit specifically declined to require genetic enhancement. Parfit, supra
note 77, at 126-27. Accord Kavka, supra note 47, at 99-104.
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above, regulation will be most defensible where the threat to the wel-
fare of future children is serious and the conflicting interests are least
powerful. 82
Context will be crucial. Mandating an abortion after a positive
test for genetic abnormality is qualitatively different from asking
Parfit's mother to wait a few months before conceiving. Each pro-
posed intervention must be analyzed on its own terms, exploring both
the benefits likely to be conferred on future children and the degree
of likely interference with the recognized rights and interests of the
parents, providers, and, in the case of mandatory abortions, the fetus.
Mandatory abortion would sacrifice a living fetus on behalf of future
class welfare and would do so by forcibly invading the bodily integrity
of the mother. That is radically different from, for example, placing a
limit on the number of embryos implanted at one time. Just as Ameri-
can courts do not require individuals to donate organs to dying rela-
tives,83 they will not require women to undergo the coerced abortion
of genetically impaired fetuses in order to protect the average well-
being of future children. Mandatory abortions will remain unthink-
able even if the analysis proposed here is adopted.
The virtue of this expanded conception of harm is that it forces us
to address these contextual differences and account for them, rather
than dismissing the welfare of future generations as morally irrele-
vant. The moral dimension of genetic screening, for example, is famil-
iar to any woman who knows that she carries a dangerous gene or who
conceives in her late forties. Under these circumstances, many
women agonize over their choices. The wrongful life approach cannot
account for this agony. A class-based analysis helps to fill that moral
vacuum. By doing so, it enriches our understanding of the moral con-
fficts posed by the capacity to do genetic screening. Its ability to
detect these moral dilemmas and bring them to the surface is a
strength, rather than a weakness.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE QUESTIONS
The conventional model of harming overlooks an important cate-
gory of harmful conduct. Because it focuses exclusively on the pres-
ence or absence of harm to individuals who are actually born, this
model ignores the ability of actors, like the Italian sperm bank, to
82. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
83. See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978). See also Head v. Colloton, 331
N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1983).
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reduce human suffering by engaging in more responsible conduct.
When a reproductive choice results in the birth of a child who will
suffer more, rather than one who will suffer less, that choice causes
unnecessary harm. Although no individual child can claim to have
been personally harmed, the class of children conceived as a result of
these choices will suffer more than they need to have suffered.
The narrow focus of the traditional model of harm is well-suited
for use in tort litigation. In an action for compensatory damages,
proof of harm to the claimant is essential. However, this narrow
notion of harm is not appropriate for public health regulation.
Because public health regulation is concerned with community wel-
fare, it can and should take into account the unnecessary harm that
reproductive choices can inflict on future children as a class.
Lawmakers who contemplate the regulation of existence-induc-
ing behavior, such as cloning and surrogacy, should consider not only
whether the children who owe their lives to that technology have lives
worth living, but also whether happier, healthier children would be
born if these technologies were used differently or not at all.I
Treating the failure to maximize child welfare as harmful conduct
is consistent with our moral barometers. It provides us with a more
robust conception of the interests of future children. I Consequently, it
offers an important additional perspective for evaluating not only new
reproductive technologies like cloning and genetic manipulation, but
also older ones, like surrogacy, in vitro fertilization, and fertility drugs.
In the current debate over cloning, furthermore, it provides a coher-
ent basis for the NBAC's consideration of potential hrms to cloned
children.
At the same time, this model requires close attention to the
reproductive options that are actually available to specific individuals.
Only after those alternatives are compared can conclusions be
reached about the harmfulness of the chosen course of action. In this
respect, the NBAC's call for a blanket moratorium is too blunt and
non-contextual. The propriety of running the risks associated with
cloning will turn on the circumstances.
This unconventional approach does not dictate or even support
state intervention every time that a harmful choice is made. Before a
decision about regulation can be reached, lawmakers must also con-
sider the interests of parents, providers, and others who may be
affected by the regulation. The significance of this new methodology
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is not that it requires intervention, but that it requires justification in
cases overlooked by more conventional notions of harm. 4
84. This approach also raises some intriguing second-generation questions, such as whether
adoption should sometimes count as an available option and how uncertainty about risks and
about the odds of a live birth should factor into this analysis. For a preliminary assessment of the
role of uncertainty, see supra note 53. On the relevance of adoption, see PETER SINGER &
DEANE WELLs, MAKING BABIES: THE NEw ScmNcE AND ETrics OF CONCEPTION 44-46 (1985)
(forcing adoption not likely to be successful; but no right to genetic offspring); Jan Narveson,
Future People and Us, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 49 (1978). The adoption
option is not strictly analogous to the conception choices previously examined because it does
not offer the parents the option of bringing into the world a genetically related child. However,
similarities between the two choices exist. In adoption, as with other cases of substitution, need-
less suffering can be avoided by not conceiving the would-be affected child and by rearing
another available child. In fact, the case for intervention is arguably stronger here because the
children who will benefit are actually living, unlike Parfit's unconceived healthy child.
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